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Abstract
The paper examines bargaining over a one–dimensional set of social states, with a
unanimity acceptance rule. We consider a class of δ–equilibria, i.e. subgame perfect
equilibria in stationary strategies that are free of coordination failures in the response
stage. We show that along any sequence of δ–equilibria, as δ converges to one, the
proposal of each player converges to the same limit. The limit, called the bargaining
outcome, is uniquely determined by the set of players, the recognition probabilities,
and the utility functions, and it is independent of the choice of the sequence. We
characterize the bargaining outcome as a unique solution of a characteristic equation.
JEL classiﬁcation code: C78
Keywords: Bargaining, subgame perfect equilibrium, unanimity rule.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies bargaining in a group of players over a one–dimensional set of alterna-
tives or social outcomes. The alternatives may represent the level of taxation, the amount
of the public good, or a location of a facility.
Bargaining proceeds as follows. First, nature chooses a player to make a proposal.
Recognition probabilities (i.e. the distribution on the moves of nature) are time–invariant.
The chosen player then puts forward a proposal that speciﬁes one alternative. The players
react sequentially, in an exogenously given order. Each player can accept or reject a pro-
posal. If the players unanimously agree to a proposal, it is implemented and the procedure
ends. Otherwise, a new time period begins, and a new proposer is chosen. Each time a
new period begins, a discount factor δ applies.
The central question of the paper is, of course, what alternative or alternatives will
be eventually chosen. The paper gives a surprisingly sharp answer to the question as it
identiﬁes a speciﬁc alternative that is a unique outcome, in a sense made precise below, of
the bargaining procedure.
It is clear that the model of bargaining with the unanimity rule as described above
is not equally applicable to all instances where negotiations take place. However, there
are important real–life examples where the unanimity is indeed required. Thus, peace or
disarmament talks are likely to achieve a viable agreement if it is approved upon by all
parties.
It is well–known that bargaining procedures such as the one above typically have in-
ﬁnitely many subgame perfect equilibria, including equilibria where delay occurs. For that
reason we shall restrict attention to a class of subgame perfect equilibria involving only
stationary strategies. Stationarity means that an equilibrium proposal of any player does
not depend on the history of play and that the reaction of any player to a proposal only
depends on the proposal itself.
When there are ﬁnitely many players, in a subgame perfect equilibrium involving only
stationary strategies there is no delay. However, with inﬁnitely many players, stationar-
ity alone does not guarantee immediate acceptance of equilibrium proposals and even a
perpetual disagreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary
strategies. Despite the fact that players respond to a proposal sequentially, coordination
failures can occur when a proposal is rejected by inﬁnitely many players. We shall only
be concerned with subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies that are robust to
coordination failures in the response stage, in the sense that, whenever a proposal is re-
jected, for at least one player rejection remains a best response even if all other players,
by mistake, accept. In any such equilibrium, no delay ever occurs.
Even in this class of equilibria, the individual acceptance sets are indeterminate. I
shall further narrow down the class of strategies by looking at δ–equilibria that pin down
a speciﬁc functional form for the individual acceptance sets. Restricting attention to δ–
equilibria is without loss of generality, however: in terms of equilibrium proposals and
equilibrium utilities, the class of δ–equilibria eﬀectively represents all subgame perfect
equilibria in stationary strategies that are robust to coordination failures in the response
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stage.
The concept of δ–equilibrium as a solution concept for a social choice problem suﬀers
from two obvious disadvantages. One disadvantage is that a given δ–equilibrium does not
unambiguously pin down a speciﬁc alternative, because diﬀerent players make diﬀerent
proposals in equilibrium. Furthermore, it depends on the discount factor δ. This motivates
us to consider the asymptotic behavior of δ–equilibria as δ converges to one.
We prove that along any sequence of δ–equilibria, as the discount factor δ converges
to one, the equilibrium proposals of all players converge to the same limit, and the social
acceptance set collapses to a point. This point, called the bargaining outcome, is inde-
pendent of the choice of the sequence and is uniquely determined by the set of players,
recognition probabilities and the utility functions. The main result of the paper is a char-
acterization of the bargaining outcome as the unique solution of a characteristic equation.
The characterization is particularly simple in the special case where the player’s utility of
an alternative x is a linear function of the distance of that player’s ideal point from x. In
this case, the bargaining outcome is the unique zero of the function g that assigns to each
alternative x the mass of players with the ideal points in the interval (x, 1].
In the special case of the model with two players, the bargaining outcome as deﬁned
above coincides with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, with weights equal to the
respective recognition probabilities. In this case the characteristic equation is a ﬁrst–order
condition for the maximization of the asymmetric Nash product.
This paper is closely related to the work Cardona and Ponsati [2]. Cardona and Ponsati
[2] study bargaining over a one–dimensional set of social outcomes, with a deterministic
recognition rule where a passing of a proposal requires an approval of at least q players. The
authors prove stationary equilibrium to be asymptotically unique: for a given quota q, as
the discount factor converges to one, the equilibrium proposals of all players approach the
same limit, the limit being independent of the recognition sequence. While Cardona and
Ponsati [2] prove asymptotic uniqueness of stationary equilibria, they do not provide an
explicit computation of the limit. Our results are therefore complementary. We contribute
to the insights in [2] by showing that the bargaining outcome can be characterized as a
unique zero of a characteristic equation, but our results apply only to a game of bargaining
with random recognition and the unanimity acceptance rule.
The setup of this paper is close that in Banks and Duggan [1] and Cho and Duggan
[3]. Banks and Duggan [1] consider bargaining over a set of social outcomes that is an
arbitrary compact convex subset of an Euclidean space. The bargaining protocol examined
in Banks and Duggan [1] has time–invariant recognition probabilities and a general voting
rule. A voting rule is represented by a family of decisive coalitions, and the approval of a
proposal by any of these coalitions is suﬃcient for the passing of a proposal. Unanimity
rule considered in this paper is a voting rule where the entire player set is the only decisive
coalition. Banks and Duggan [1] prove existence of stationary equilibrium and examine
the equilibrium set in the case of perfectly patient players (i.e. when the discount factor
equals one). The setting in Cho and Duggan [3] is similar to that in Banks and Duggan
[1], but the paper focuses on the case of a one–dimensional set of alternatives.
The bargaining protocol studied in this paper is the same as the bargaining protocol
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in Banks and Duggan [1] and Cho and Duggan [3] with the unanimity acceptance rule. In
particular, the class of δ–equilibria coincides with a class of stationary equilibria as deﬁned
in Cho and Duggan [3], under the unanimity rule.
This work builds on a contribution of Herings and Predtetchinski [4]. Herings and
Predtetchinski [4] study a bargaining protocol where the identity of a proposer follows a
Markov process, and player’s utility of an alternative x is a linear function of the distance
of that player’s ideal point from x. The setup of this paper is much more general with
respect to the utility functions: it is only assumed that each utility function is continuous,
concave and has a single peak (ideal point). On the other hand, we do not treat a general
Markov recognition rule, but restrict attention to the case of time–invariant recognition
probabilities.
As we have already mentioned, when there are only two players, the bargaining outcome
in a model of one–dimensional coincides with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
With more than two players, the bargaining outcome does not in general maximize the
(asymmetric) Nash product. The model of one–dimensional bargaining therefore provides
a complementary set of the results to those in Miyakawa [5], where the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution for an n–person bargaining problem is obtained as a limit of stationary
equilibria in a game of bargaining with time–invariant recognition probabilities, as the
probability of the breakdown of negotiations converges to zero.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the most important ideas
and deﬁnitions including the deﬁnition of stationary strategy, a deﬁnition of δ–equilibrium,
and of bargaining outcome. Section 3 illustrates the key insights by means of an example.
We consider a world where player’s utility of an alternative x depends linearly on the
distance between the player’s location and x. For this special case we prove that the
bargaining outcome is the unique zero of the function g that maps each alternative x into
the mass of players in the interval (0, x].
Section 4 proves existence of δ–equilibrium. Banks and Duggan [1] prove the existence
of no–delay stationary equilibria, but they assume ﬁnitely many players. We extend the
existence result to environments with an arbitrary player set, under appropriate continuity
assumptions.
In Section 5 the set of 1–equilibria is analyzed. It is demonstrated that in each 1–
equilibrium the social acceptance set is a singleton. We also show that, given a weakly
Pareto–eﬃcient alternative, there exists a 1–equilibrium where each player proposes x.
Furthermore, it is proved that along any sequence of δ–equilibria as δ converges to one,
the social acceptance set collapses to a point.
Section 6 introduces the characteristic function and the main result of the paper. The
next section is devoted to the proof of the main result.
Section 8 proves that each δ–equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium. If the
number of players is ﬁnite, for a given stationary subgame perfect equilibrium there exists
a δ–equilibrium with the same proposals and equilibrium utilities. More generally, if a
subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies is robust to coordination failures in the
response stage, then there exists a δ–equilibrium having the same proposals and equilibrium
utilities. In this sense, δ–equilibria eﬀectively represent all subgame perfect equilibria in
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stationary strategies that are robust to coordination failures in the response stage.
2 The components of the model
2.1 A description of the world and a game of bargaining
We study a world ω described by the following variables: X, N , A , µ, and u•. The symbol
X denotes the unit interval [0, 1]. This is a space of alternatives or social states the players
must choose from. The set N is a set of players that can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. The symbol
A denotes a sigma–algebra of subsets of N , and µ is the probability measure. Thus the
triple (N,A , µ) is a probability space. The probability measure represents the distribution
of types within the population. The symbol u• denotes a collection of utility functions,
one for each player. The utility function of player t ∈ N is ut : X → [0, 1].
Without further mentioning we shall assume that the characteristics of the world satisfy
the following assumption.
(A1) For each t ∈ N the utility function ut : X → [0, 1] is concave, continuous, and it
attains its unique maximum at point x¯t. The function x¯• : N → X given by t → x¯t
is A –measurable.
Given a discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] we deﬁne a game of bargaining Γ(δ) as follows. The
game starts in period zero. Each period τ begins with nature randomly choosing a player
from the set N to make a proposal. A probability for a proposer to be a member of a set
S ∈ A is µ(S). The chosen player proposes an alternative x from X. All players (including
the proposer) respond. We assume that the players resound sequentially, according to a
total order > on the player set N . The order > is ﬁxed throughout the game. Each
responder can either accept or reject the current proposal. If the responders unanimously
agree to the proposal, the game terminates and the proposal is implemented. Otherwise,
period τ + 1 begins.
If alternative x is agreed upon in period τ , player i receives a payoﬀ of δτui(x). The
payoﬀ of perpetual disagreement to any player is zero.
It is well known that games of bargaining with more than two players typically have
inﬁnitely many subgame perfect equilibria, including equilibria with delay. In order to
make a prediction about an outcome of the game, one would often restrict attention to
a smaller class of equilibria, typically a class of subgame perfect equilibria involving only
stationary strategies. This approach is also adopted in our paper. The exact deﬁnition of
a proﬁle of stationary strategies is as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A joint strategy σ is said to be stationary if there exist an A –measurable
function x• : N → X and a collection A• of subsets At of X, one for each t ∈ N , with ∩At
a Borel–measurable set such that (a) whenever player t has to make a proposal, player t
proposes xt, and (b) whenever player t has to respond to a proposal x, player t accepts if
and only if x ∈ At. The set At is called an individual acceptance set of player t and ∩At is
called a social acceptance set.
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2.2 A δ–equilibrium and a bargaining solution
We shall use the following solution concept for the game Γ(δ), called for brevity δ–
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 Let x• : N → X be an A –measurable function and y• : N → [0, 1] be
an arbitrary function. Let A• be a collection of subsets At of X for t ∈ N . Let A be a
non–empty subset of X. The tuple (x•, y•, A•, A) is said to be a δ–equilibrium of the world
ω if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
xt = argmaxx∈A ut(x) for each t ∈ N,
yt =
∫
ut(xi)dµ(i) for each t ∈ N,
At = {x ∈ X|ut(x) ≥ δyt} for each t ∈ N,
A = ∩At.
In a δ–equilibrium no delay ever occurs, as all equilibrium proposals are unanimously
accepted. As we show in Section 8, if (x•, y•, A•, A) is a δ–equilibrium, then the joint sta-
tionary strategy (x•, A•) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ(δ). Conversely,
if the player set N is ﬁnite and the joint stationary strategy (x•, A•) is a subgame per-
fect equilibrium, then the equilibrium proposal map x• is a part of some δ–equilibrium
(x•, y˙•, A˙•, A˙). In particular, each xt is unanimously accepted. In general, if the joint
stationary strategy (x•, A•) is a subgame perfect equilibrium and is free of coordination
failures in the response stage of the game (in the sense made precise in Section 8), then
the equilibrium proposal map x• is a part of some δ–equilibrium (x•, y˙•, A˙•, A˙).
Since we assume utility functions to be concave, each individual acceptance set is an
interval. We shall use the notation [x−t , x
+
t ] to denote the individual acceptance set At of
player t. The social acceptance set is also a closed interval, denoted by [x−, x+] or [x−, x+].
Furthermore,
x− = sup{x−t } and x
+ = inf{x+t },
where the supremum and the inﬁnum are taken over all t ∈ N . The equilibrium proposal
xt of player t is a point of [x
−, x+] closest to x¯t, the ideal point of individual t. Thus
xt =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x− if x¯t ≤ x
−
x¯t if x
− ≤ x¯t ≤ x
+
x+ if x+ ≤ x¯t.
Notice that the function x• thus deﬁned is A –measurable.
Deﬁnition 3 For each natural n let (xn• , y
n
• , A
n
• , A
n) be a δn–equilibrium of the world ω and
let xn be a point in An. Suppose that the sequence δn converges to one and xn converges to
x. Then the alternative x is called a bargaining outcome of ω. A collection of bargaining
outcomes is called a bargaining solution.
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The main result of the paper states that the bargaining outcome is unique. In particular,
along any sequence of δ–equilibria, as δ converges to one, the social acceptance set collapses
to a point, and in the limit all players make the same proposal. The next section illustrates
this important insight by an example.
2.3 General remarks
For a subset B of R we write IntB to denote the interior of B. In particular, IntX = (0, 1).
Assumption (A1) implies that each function ut is positive on IntX and that it is not a
constant on any non–degenerate interval I ⊂ X.
A concave function f : X → R has left and right derivatives at each point x of IntX
denoted by f ′(x− 0) and f ′(x+ 0). We shall often use the following fact: Given x ∈ IntX
and x˙ ∈ X, the inequality f(x˙)− f(x) ≤ s(x˙− x) holds for each s ∈ [f ′(x− 0), f ′(x + 0)].
3 An example
This section builds on the results in Herings and Predtetchinski [4]. Consider a world λ
where N ⊂ [0, 1] is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite set of players containing 0 and 1. We assume that A
is a sigma–algebra of Borel subsets of N . The utility function of player t ∈ N is ut(x) =
1− |x − t|. Deﬁne a function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] by letting g(x) = µ({i ∈ N |x < i}). Then
1− g is the cumulative distribution function on X induced by the probability measure µ.
The function g is non–decreasing and it is continuous if µ is non–atomic, i.e. if µ({t}) = 0
for each t ∈ N . We need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 Point x ∈ X is a generalized ﬁxed point of the function f : X → X if
there are sequences xn− and x
n
+ of points in X converging to x such that lim f(x
n
−) ≤ x ≤
lim f(xn+).
It is clear that any ﬁxed point x of f is also a generalized ﬁxed point of f (take xn− = x
and xn+ = x). Conversely, if f is continuous, then any generalized ﬁxed point of f is also
its ﬁxed point. If f is a non–increasing function, then it has exactly one generalized ﬁxed
point.
Proposition 1
(i) For each δ ∈ [0, 1) the world λ has a unique δ–equilibrium. The equilibrium proposals
are given by Figure 1 below, where [x−, x+] is a social acceptance set.
(ii) Let N = [0, 1] and suppose that µ(B) = µ(1 − B) for each Borel–measurable set
B ⊂ N , where 1 − B = {1 − t|t ∈ B}. Then x− = δ/2 and x+ = 1 − δ/2, and the
unique bargaining outcome of the world λ is 1/2.
(iii) The world λ has a unique bargaining outcome being the generalized ﬁxed point of the
function g.
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x−
x+
t
xt
Figure 1: Equilibrium proposal xt in the example of Section 3.
Proof. Let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a δ–equilibrium of λ and let At = [x
−
t , x
+
t ] and A = [x
−, x+].
First we show that the triple (x•, x
−, x+) satisﬁes the following equations:
xt =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x− if t ≤ x−
t if x− ≤ t ≤ x+
x+ if x+ ≤ t,
(1)
x− = δE(x•) and x
+ = 1− δ + δE(x•). (2)
The proposal xt of player t is the point of [x
−, x+] which is closest to t, as is illustrated
in Figure 1 above, whence Equation 1. To derive Equation 2, we compute:
yt = 1−
∫
|xi − t|dµ(i),
x−t = (t− [1− δyt]) ∨ 0 and x
+
t = (t + [1− δyt]) ∧ 1.
Now one can see that x−• : N → X and x
+
• : N → X are non–decreasing functions.
It follows that x− = x−1 and x
+ = x+0 . Because u1(x) = x, we have y1 = E(x•) and
therefore x−1 = δE(x•). Because u0(x) = 1 − x, we have y0 = 1 − E(x•) and therefore
x+0 = 1− δ + δE(x•). Equation 2 follows.
Existence of δ–equilibrium will be proven more generally in Section 4. We prove that
for each δ ∈ [0, 1) the world λ has at most one δ–equilibrium by showing that the system
1–2 has at most one solution. Suppose the triples (x•, x
−, x+) and (x˙•, x˙
−, x˙+) both satisfy
Equations 1–2. Let |x˙•−x•| = sup |x˙t−xt|. Then |x˙
−−x−| = |x˙+−x+| = δ|E(x˙•−x•)| ≤
δ|x˙• − x•|. On the other hand, as we show in the proof of Proposition 3, |x˙• − x•| ≤
|x− − x˙−| ∨ |x+ − x˙+|. It follows that (x•, x
−, x+) = (x˙•, x˙
−, x˙+), as desired.
To prove claim (ii) let x− = δ/2 and x+ = 1 − δ/2 and let x• be as in Figure 1. We
show that E(x•) = 1/2. It is then clear that the triple (x•, x
−, x+) satisﬁes the system
1–2. Since the system admits but one solution, x• must be the equilibrium proposal map
and [x−, x+] the social acceptance set in a δ–equilibrium of λ.
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Since x+ + x− = 1, we have x1−t + xt = 1 for all t ∈ N . Let {s
n
•} be a sequence
of simple functions converging pointwise to x•. Deﬁne a function s˙
n
• by the equation
s˙nt = 1/2(1+s
n
t −s
n
1−t) for all t ∈ N . The function s˙
n
• is a simple function and the sequence
{s˙n•} converges pointwise to x•. Thus E(s˙
n
• ) converges to E(x•).
It remains to show that E(s˙n• ) = 1/2. Suppose s
n
• =
∑
ak1Bk , where Bk are Borel–
measurable subsets of N . Then s˙n• = 1/2(1 +
∑
ak1Bk −
∑
ak11−Bk). Therefore, E(s˙
n
• ) =
1/2(1 +
∑
akµ(Bk)−
∑
akµ(1− Bk)) = 1/2, because µ(Bk) = µ(1−Bk) for all k.
We prove claim (iii). As before, let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a δ–equilibrium of λ with A =
[x−, x+]. We estimate the expected equilibrium proposal from from below and from above,
as follows. Deﬁne maps z−• : N → X and z
+
• : N → X by the following equations:
z−t =
{
x− if t ∈ [0, x+]
x+ otherwise
and z+t =
{
x− if t ∈ [0, x−]
x+ otherwise.
Both maps are measurable and z−t ≤ xt ≤ z
+
t for all t ∈ N . Therefore,
E(z−• ) ≤ E(x•) ≤ E(z
+
• ), where
E(z−• ) = (1− g(x
+))x− + g(x+)x+ = (1− δ)g(x+) + δE(x•),
E(z+• ) = (1− g(x
−))x− + g(x−)x+ = (1− δ)g(x−) + δE(x•).
Rewriting the above system yields
g(x+) ≤ E(x•) ≤ g(x
−).
Let (xn• , y
n
• , A
n
• , A
n) be a δn–equilibrium of λ with A = [xn−, x
n
+]. Suppose δ
n converges
to one. Without loss of generality assume that both sequences xn− and x
n
+ converge. Be-
cause xn+ − x
n
− = 1− δ
n, the sequences xn− and x
n
+ converge to the same limit, say a point
x. The point x is a bargaining outcome of λ. As xn− ≤ x
n
t ≤ x
n
+, the equilibrium proposal
xnt of each player t also converges to x, and so does the expected value E(x
n
• ). We know
that g(xn+) ≤ E(x
n
• ) ≤ g(x
n
−) for each n. Taking the limit, we ﬁnd that x is a generalized
ﬁxed point of g, as desired.
4 Existence of δ–equilibrium
The results of this section rely on the following additional assumptions.
(A2) The inequality inf{ut(x¯t)} > 0 holds.
(A3) The family of functions u• is jointly continuous: Given an x ∈ X and an  > 0 there
exists a ε = ε(x, ) such that |ut(x)− ut(x˙)| <  for all t ∈ N whenever |x− x˙| < ε.
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If the player set N is ﬁnite, assumptions (A2) and (A3) are automatically satisﬁed. Indeed,
assumption (A1) implies that ut(x¯t) > 0 for all t ∈ N , for otherwise the function ut
would have been identically zero. Also, any ﬁnite family of continuous functions is jointly
continuous.
In the general case, assumption (A1) implies that the family u• is jointly continuous
at any point x in the interior of X, so that joint discontinuity can occur only at points 0
and 1. As an example of a family of utility functions that violates (A3) consider
ut(x) =
{
x/t, if x ≤ t
(1− x)/(1− t), if x ≥ t,
where the player set is N = (0, 1). Then the family u• satisﬁes assumptions (A1) and
(A2) but it is not uniformly continuous at either point of the boundary of X.
Consider also the following assumption.
(A4) The family of functions u• is jointly uniformly continuous: Given an  > 0 there
exists a ε = ε() such that |ut(x)− ut(x˙)| <  for all t ∈ N whenever |x− x˙| < ε.
Assumption (A4) diﬀers from (A3) in that ε depends only on  but not on x, whereas in
(A3) it can depend on both. In fact, the two conditions are equivalent. To see this, let
F denote the set of all functions N → X endowed with a usual sup–norm: |x• − x˙•| =
sup |xt − x˙t| for x• and x˙• in F . Let u• denote a map X → F given by x → u•(x).
Then assumption (A3) can be equivalently stated as saying that the map u• is continuous.
Assumption (A4), on the other hand, is equivalent to a requirement that the map u• be
uniformly continuous. As X is a compact space, any map from X to a metric space is
uniformly continuous if and only if it is continuous. Thus assumption (A3) can be replaced
with (A4) without loss of generality.
Theorem 1 Let δ ∈ [0, 1). Suppose ω satisﬁes the assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3).
Then ω has a δ–equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 1 we characterize the δ–equilibrium as a ﬁxed point of a continuous
map.
Let F denote the set of all functions N → X endowed with a sup–norm. Let D
be a collection of all closed intervals [a, b] in X. We shall identify D with a subspace
{(a, b) ∈ X × X|a ≤ b} of X × X. Let M denote the set of all A –measurable functions
x• : N → X. Let Y be a set of maps y• : N → X such that there exists an x ∈ X with
yt ≤ ut(x) for all t ∈ N . The sets M and Y are considered subspaces of F . Let S be a
set of all families of closed intervals A• in X such that ∩At is non–empty. Alternatively,
one can think of S as a set of pairs (x−• , x
+
• ) of maps x
−
• : N → X and x
+
• : N → X, such
that x−t ≤ x ≤ x
+
t for all t ∈ N for some x ∈ X. Then S can be considered a subspace of
F × F .
Deﬁne f to be a composite map
D
f1
−→ M
f2
−→ Y
f3
−→ S
f4
−→ D, where
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f1(x
−, x+)t =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x− if x¯t ≤ x
−
x¯t if x
− ≤ x¯t ≤ x
+
x+ if x+ ≤ x¯t
for each (x−, x+) ∈ D,
f2(x•)t =
∫
i
ut(xi)dµ(i) for each x• ∈ M,
f3(y•)t = {x ∈ X|δyt ≤ ut(x)} for each y• ∈ Y,
f4(A•) = ∩At for each A• ∈ S.
The map f4 can also be written as
f4(x
−
• , x
+
• ) = (sup{x
−
t }, inf{x
+
t }) for each (x
−
• , x
+
• ) ∈ S.
It is obvious that an interval [x−, x+] is a social acceptance set in a δ–bargaining outcome
if and only if it is a ﬁxed point of the map f . The map f1 maps each interval A to an
equilibrium proposal map. The map f2 transforms equilibrium proposals into a collection
of expected utilities, whereas f3 maps expected utilities to individual acceptance sets.
Finally, f4 maps individual acceptance sets to a social acceptance set.
It remains to show that the map f is continuous. First we establish the following
auxiliary proposition. Deﬁne
m = inf
{
|u′t(x− 0)|
∣∣∣∣∣ (t, x) ∈ N × IntXut(x) ≤ δut(x¯t)
}
.
Proposition 2 If δ ∈ [0, 1), then m > 0.
Proof. Let t ∈ N and x ∈ IntX be such that ut(x) ≤ δut(x¯t). Then ut(x¯t) − ut(x) ≤
u′t(x− 0)(x¯t − x). We have thus the following chain of inequalities:
|u′t(x− 0)| ≥
ut(x¯t)− ut(x)
|x¯t − x|
≥
(1− δ)ut(x¯t)
|x¯t − x|
≥ (1− δ)ut(x¯t).
It follows that
m ≥ (1− δ) inf{ut(x¯t)}
Assumption (A2) now implies that m is positive.
Proposition 3 If δ ∈ [0, 1), then the map f is continuous.
Proof. The map f1 is continuous. Let A = [x
−, x+] and A˙ = [x˙−, x˙+]. Let f1(A) = x•
and f1(A˙) = x˙•. The continuity of f1 follows from the inequality
|x• − x˙•| ≤ |x
− − x˙−| ∨ |x+ − x˙+|.
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To prove the inequality, ﬁx a t and let  = |x− − x˙−| ∨ |x+ − x˙+|. First we show
that there is a point in A at a distance of at most  from x˙t. Similarly, there is a point
in A˙ at a distance of at most  from xt. To see this, write xt as a convex combination
of x− and x+ and x˙t as a convex combination of x˙
− and x˙+: xt = ax
− + (1 − a)x+
and x˙t = a˙x˙
− + (1 − a˙)x˙+, and deﬁne the points z˙t ∈ A˙ and zt ∈ A by the equations
z˙t = ax˙
− + (1− a)x˙+ and zt = a˙x
− + (1− a˙)x+. Then
|z˙t − xt| ≤ a|x˙
− − x−|+ (1− a)|x˙+ − x+| ≤  and
|zt − x˙t| ≤ a˙|x˙
− − x−|+ (1− a˙)|x˙+ − x+| ≤ .
We also have the following obvious property: Let x ∈ A. If x < xt, then xt ≤ x¯t and if
xt < x, then x¯t ≤ xt. A similar property holds for A˙.
Now we prove that xt ≤ x˙t + . Suppose not. Then we have zt ≤ x˙t +  < xt.
Since zt is a point of A, this means that xt ≤ x¯t. On the other hand, we also have
x˙t < xt −  ≤ z˙t. Since z˙t is a point of A˙, we have x¯t ≤ x˙t. We arrive at a contradiction,
because x¯t ≤ x˙t < xt −  < xt ≤ x¯t. The proof that x˙t ≤ xt +  is similar.
The map f2 is continuous. Let f2(x•) = y• and f2(x˙•) = y˙•. Let  and ε be as in
assumption (A4). Suppose |x• − x˙•| < ε. Then |ut(xi) − ut(x˙i)| <  for all t and i in N .
Therefore,
|yt − y˙t| ≤
∫
i
|ut(xi)− ut(x˙i)|dµ(i) ≤ .
It follows that |y• − y˙•| ≤ .
The map f3 is continuous. Let f3(y•) = (x
−
• , x
+
• ) and f3(y˙•) = (x˙
−
• , x˙
+
• ). The continuity
of f3 is implied by the inequalities
|x−• − x˙
−
• | ≤
δ|y• − y˙•|
m
and |x+• − x˙
+
• | ≤
δ|y• − y˙•|
m
.
These inequalities are proven by showing that
|x−t − x˙
−
t | ≤
δ|yt − y˙t|
m
and |x+t − x˙
+
t | ≤
δ|yt − y˙t|
m
for all t ∈ N . We prove the ﬁrst set of inequalities. The proof of the second set of
inequalities is analogous.
Recall that
x−t = inf{x ∈ X|δyt ≤ ut(x)} and x˙
−
t = inf{x ∈ X|δy˙t ≤ ut(x)}.
Thus, δyt ≤ ut(x
−
t ) and δy˙t ≤ ut(x˙
−
t ). Without loss of generality, assume x˙
−
t < x
−
t .
In particular, 0 < x−t , implying the equality δyt = ut(x
−
t ). Notice that both points x˙
−
t
and x−t lie in the interval [0, x¯t), where ut is an increasing function. Thus the inequality
ut(x˙
−
t ) < ut(x
−
t ) holds. Also, the left derivative of ut at x
−
t is positive. Thus, we have the
inequalities
0 < u′t(x
−
t − 0)(x
−
t − x˙
−
t ) ≤ ut(x
−
t )− ut(x˙
−
t ) ≤ δ(yt − y˙t).
12
They yield the inequalities
0 < x−t − x˙
−
t ≤
δ(yt − y˙t)
u′t(x
−
t − 0)
.
Since y• is an element of Y , we have the inequality yt ≤ ut(x¯t). Therefore, ut(x
−
t ) =
δyt ≤ δut(x¯t). It follows that m ≤ |u
′
t(x
−
t − 0)|. This gives the desired inequality
0 < x−t − x˙
−
t ≤
δ(yt − y˙t)
m
.
The map f4 is continuous. Let f4(x
−
• , x
+
• ) = (x
−, x+) and f4(x˙
−
• , x˙
+
• ) = (x˙
−, x˙+). We
have an obvious inequality |x−t − x˙
−
t | ≤ |x
−
• − x˙
−
• |. Then x
−
t − |x
−
• − x˙
−
• | ≤ x˙
−
t ≤ x˙
−
for all t, hence x− − |x−• − x˙
−
• | ≤ x˙
−. Also, x˙−t − |x
−
• − x˙
−
• | ≤ x
−
t ≤ x
− for all t, hence
x˙− − |x−• − x˙
−
• | ≤ x
−. Thus, |x− − x˙−| ≤ |x−• − x˙
−
• |. Similarly one derives an inequality
|x+ − x˙+| ≤ |x+• − x˙
+
• |. Together they imply the continuity of f4.
5 The asymptotic behavior of δ–equilibria
This section is to devoted to Theorems 2 and 3 below. The ﬁrst of these describes the
set of δ–equilibria when δ = 1 and shows that in each 1–equilibrium the social acceptance
set is a singleton. The second theorem shows that along any sequence of δ–equilibria as δ
converges to one, the social acceptance set collapses to a point.
An alternative x is said to be weakly Pareto–eﬃcient if there is no x˙ ∈ X such that
ut(x˙) > ut(x) for all t ∈ N . Each alternative in the open interval (inf{x¯t}, sup{x¯t})
is weakly Pareto–eﬃcient. Furthermore, all alternatives in ∪{x¯t} are obviously weakly
Pareto–eﬃcient. On the other hand, each weakly Pareto–eﬃcient alternative lies in the
closed interval [inf{x¯t}, sup{x¯t}]. If the player set is inﬁnite it is easy to construct a family
of the utility functions in such a way that the alternatives inf{x¯t} and sup{x¯t} are not
weakly eﬃcient.
Theorem 2 In each 1–equilibrium the social acceptance set is a singleton. Conversely,
given a weakly Pareto–eﬃcient alternative x, there exists a 1–equilibrium with a social
acceptance set consisting of point x alone.
As in the preceding section, we shall identify an interval [a, b] ⊂ X with a point (a, b) ∈
X ×X. Thus the collection of all closed intervals in X can be seen as a metric space.
Theorem 3 For each natural number n let An be a social acceptance set in a δn–equilibrium.
If the sequence An converges to an interval A and the sequence δn converges to 1, then A
is a singleton.
The second part of Theorem 2 is easy to prove. Thus let x be a weakly Pareto–eﬃcient
alternative. Deﬁne (x•, y•, A•, A) by letting x• be identically equal to x, yt = ut(x) and
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At = {x˙ ∈ X | ut(x˙) ≥ ut(x)} for all t ∈ N and A = ∩At. We show that the set A consists
of point x alone. It then follows that (x•, y•, A•, A) is a 1–equilibrium.
It is clear that x is an element of A. Suppose A contains an open interval I. For
each point x˙ in I it must hold that ut(x˙) > ut(x), for otherwise the function ut would be
constant on I, contradicting assumption (A1). But then x is not a weakly Pareto–eﬃcient
alternative, a contradiction. It follows that A is a singleton.
To prove the rest of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 it is convenient to consider an auxiliary
concept of pseudo–equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 5 Let x• : N → X be an A –measurable function and y• : N → [0, 1] be
an arbitrary function. Let A• be a collection of subsets At of X for t ∈ N . Let A be a
non–empty subset of X. The tuple (x•, y•, A•, A) is said to be a pseudo–equilibrium if it
satisﬁes the ﬁrst two conditions of Deﬁnition 2 and
At = {x ∈ X|ut(x) ≥ yt} for each t ∈ N,
A ⊂ ∩At.
It is clear that a 1–equilibrium is also a pseudo–equilibrium. Thus Proposition 4 below
implies the ﬁrst part of Theorem 2. Together Propositions 4 and 5 imply Theorem 3.
Proposition 4 If (x•, y•, A•, A) is a pseudo–equilibrium, then A is a singleton.
Proof. Let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a pseudo–equilibrium. For each natural number n deﬁne the
set Ant = {x ∈ X | ut(x) ≥ yt + 1/n}. Observe that A
n
t is Borel–measurable being a closed
subset of X. Consequently, the set {i ∈ N | xi ∈ A
n
t } is A –measurable. Now,
yt =
∫
{i∈N |xi∈Ant }
ut(xi)dµ(i) +
∫
{i∈N |xi∈Ant }
c
ut(xi)dµ(i) ≥
≥ (yt + 1/n)µ({i ∈ N | xi ∈ A
n
t }) + ytµ({i ∈ N | xi ∈ A
n
t }
c) =
= yt + (1/n)µ({i ∈ N | xi ∈ A
n
t }).
Thus we must have µ({i ∈ N | xi ∈ A
n
t }) = 0. Deﬁne Bt = {x ∈ X | ut(x) > yt}. Clearly,
Bt = ∪
∞
n=1A
n
t . Therefore,
µ({i ∈ N | xi ∈ Bt}) ≤
∞∑
n=1
µ({i ∈ N | xi ∈ A
n
t }) = 0.
We shall prove that there is a player t ∈ N such that ut(xt) = yt. If this is indeed
the case, then the function ut is constant on the set A, because ut(xt) is an upper bound
for ut on the set A, while yt is a lower bound. Because A is convex and ut is strictly
quasi–concave, it would then follow that A is singleton.
Suppose that ut(xt) > yt for all t ∈ N . Thus xt ∈ Bt, so that the family of sets {Bt}t∈N
is an open cover of the set ∪t∈N{xt}. Then there exists a countable subset C ⊆ N such
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that the subfamily {Bt}t∈C covers ∪t∈N{xt}. This is a consequence of the fact that X has
a countable base; thus any open cover has a countable subcover.
It follows that
N =
⋃
t∈C
{i ∈ N | xi ∈ Bt}.
Therefore,
µ(N) ≤
∑
t∈C
µ({i ∈ N | xi ∈ Bt}) = 0,
which is impossible because µ(N) = 1. The result follows.
Proposition 5 Let (xn• , y
n
• , A
n
• , A
n) be a sequence of δn–equilibria. Suppose the sequence
An converges to an interval A and the sequence δn converges to 1. Then there exist maps
x• and y• and a collection of sets A• such that (x•, y•, A•, A) is a pseudo–equilibrium.
Proof. Deﬁne x•, y• and A• by the following equations
xt = argmaxx∈A ut(x) for each t ∈ N,
yt =
∫
ut(xi)dµ(i) for each t ∈ N,
At = {x ∈ X|ut(x) ≥ yt} for each t ∈ N.
Let the map f1 be as in Section 4. Recall that f1 carries an interval A into a map
x• where each xt is the point of A closest to x¯t. Thus x
n
• = f1(A
n) and x• = f1(A). As
we have seen in the proof of Proposition 3, the map f1 is continuous with respect to the
topology of unform convergence. Therefore, the sequence xn• converges uniformly to x•.
Since each function ut is continuous, the sequence ut(x
n
i ) converges to ut(xi) for all i ∈
N . Because the integral is continuous with respect to a topology of pointwise convergence,
ynt converges to yt for all t ∈ N . (We do not claim that the sequence y
n
• converges uniformly
to y•. This is not true, unless we assume that the family u• is jointly continuous).
Let An = [xn−, x
n
+] and A = [x
−, x+]. We know that An ⊂ ∩Ant . In particular,
ut(x
n
−) ≥ δ
nynt and ut(x
n
+) ≥ δ
nynt for all t ∈ N . Taking the limits, we obtain the in-
equalities ut(x
−) ≥ yt and ut(x
+) ≥ yt. This implies that A ⊂ ∩At, as desired.
6 The characteristic function
For each x ∈ IntX we deﬁne
ϕ−(x) = inf
{
u′t(x− 0)
ut(x)
}
, ϕ+(x) = sup
{
u′t(x + 0)
ut(x)
}
and
ξ(x) = µ({i ∈ N |x¯i < x})ϕ
−(x) + µ({i ∈ N |x < x¯i})ϕ
+(x).
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Claim (a) of Proposition 9 implies that the numbers ϕ−(x), ϕ+(x) and ξ(x) are ﬁnite. The
function ξ is referred to as a characteristic function. It will be convenient to extend the
characteristic function to X by letting ξ(0) = +∞ and ξ(1) = −∞.
There is nothing particularly important about the use of left derivatives in the function
ϕ− and right derivatives in ϕ+. As the reader can verify, all results remain true if one
replaces a derivative u′t(x − 0) or u
′
t(x + 0) by an arbitrary element in the subgradient
[u′t(x + 0), u
′
t(x− 0)] of the function ut.
Proposition 6 The function ϕ+ is positive and decreasing on the interval (0, sup{x¯i}).
The function ϕ− is negative and decreasing on the interval (inf{x¯i}, 1). The characteristic
function ξ is decreasing on X.
Proof. Let 
t = ln ut. The function is well–deﬁned on (0, 1) because ut(x) > 0 for all
x ∈ (0, 1). Then we can write
ϕ−(x) = inf{
′t(x− 0)} and ϕ
+(x) = sup{
′t(x + 0)}.
Since 
t is a concave function, both its left and right derivatives are non–increasing. It
follows that both ϕ− and ϕ+ are non–increasing functions.
We prove that ϕ+ is positive on the interval (0, sup{x¯i}). Given 0 < x < sup{x¯i}, there
exists a player t such that x < x¯t. For this player t it holds that u
′
t(x + 0) > 0, therefore
also 
′t(x + 0) > 0. It follows that ϕ
+(x) > 0, as desired.
We prove that ϕ+ is decreasing on (0, sup{x¯i}). Suppose not. Then there exist 0 <
a < b < sup{x¯i} such that ϕ
+(a) ≤ ϕ+(b). As we already know that the function ϕ+ is
non–increasing, it has to be a constant (say, equal to m) on the interval [a, b]. Let tq be a
sequence in N such that 
′tq(b+0)→ m. Then for each x ∈ [a, b] there are the inequalities
m ≥ 
′tq(a + 0) ≥ 

′
tq(x + 0) ≥ 

′
tq(b + 0),
where the right–hand side converges to m as q goes to inﬁnity. The ﬁrst of these inequalities
follows from the fact that m is the supremum of 
′t(a + 0), while the other two are true
because the right derivative of 
t is a non–increasing function. It follows that 

′
tq(x+0)→ m.
Now we have the inequalities

′tq(x + 0)(x− a) ≤ 
tq(x)− 
tq(a) ≤ 

′
tq(a + 0)(x− a),
where the left– and the right–hand sides converge to m(x−a). Thus 
tq(x) → 
tq(a)+m(x−
a). Since x ∈ [a, b] is arbitrary, it means that the sequence {
tq} of functions converges
pointwise on [a, b] to a linear function c + m(• − a). Therefore, the sequence {utq} of
functions converges pointwise on [a, b] to an exponential function exp(c) exp(m(• − a)).
But this is impossible, because each utq is a concave function, and the set of concave
functions on a compact interval is closed in the topology of pointwise convergence. This
contradiction establishes that ϕ+ is decreasing on the interval (0, sup{x¯i}).
The proof that ϕ− is negative and decreasing on (inf{x¯i}, 1) is similar.
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Write µ(x¯i < x) to denote µ({i ∈ N |x¯i < x}) and write µ(x < x¯i) to denote µ({i ∈
N |x < x¯i}). Consider the sets
X− = {x ∈ IntX | µ(x¯i < x) > 0} and X+ = {x ∈ IntX | µ(x < x¯i) > 0},
and the sets Xc− = IntX−X− and X
c
+ = IntX−X+. It is clear that the following inclusions
hold:
X− ⊂ (inf{x¯i}, 1) and X+ ⊂ (0, sup{x¯i}).
Furthermore, the set Xc−∩X
c
+ does not contain a non–degenerate interval. For suppose that
[a, b] ⊂ Xc− ∩X
c
+ where a < b. Then µ(N) ≤ µ(x¯i < b) + µ(a < x¯i) = 0, a contradiction.
Consider the function ξ+(•) = µ(• < x¯i)ϕ
+(•). The function µ(• < x¯i) is identically
zero on Xc+. On the set X+ the function µ(• < x¯i) is positive and non–increasing while the
function ϕ+ is positive and decreasing. It follows that the function ξ+ is identically zero on
Xc+ and is positive and decreasing on X+. Similarly, consider the function ξ
−(•) = µ(x¯i <
•)ϕ−(•). The function µ(x¯i < •) is identically zero on X
c
−. Furthermore, µ(x¯i < •) is
positive and non–decreasing on X−, while ϕ
− is negative and decreasing on X−. It follows
that ξ− identically zero on Xc− and is negative and decreasing on X−.
We now show that ξ is a decreasing function on IntX. Suppose not. Then there exist
0 < a < b < 1 such that ξ(a) ≥ ξ(b). Because ξ, ξ− and ξ+ are non–increasing functions,
all three must be constant on the interval [a, b]. From the fact that ξ− is constant on [a, b] it
follows that [a, b] ⊂ Xc−, while from the fact that ξ
+ is constant it follows that [a, b] ⊂ Xc+.
This contradiction establishes that ξ is a decreasing function on IntX.
Finally, ξ is a decreasing function on X because ξ(0) = +∞ and ξ(1) = −∞.
Deﬁnition 6 The point x ∈ X is a generalized zero of the function f : X → R ∪
{−∞,+∞} if there are sequences xn− and x
n
+ of points in X converging to x such that
lim f(xn−) ≤ 0 ≤ lim f(x
n
+).
It is clear that any point x ∈ X such that f(x) = 0 is a generalized zero of the function f
(take xn− = x and x
n
+ = x). Conversely, if f is a continuous function, then each generalized
zero x of f satisﬁes f(x) = 0. If f is a decreasing function, it has at most one generalized
zero. We are now in a position to state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 4 (Main result) Each world ω has a unique bargaining outcome. The bar-
gaining outcome of ω is the unique generalized zero of the characteristic function ξ.
Before we proceed with the proof, we verify for the world λ of Section 3 that the
conclusion of Proposition 1 agrees with the conclusion of Theorem 4. Thus let λ be the
world as in Section 3. Let g(x) = µ({i ∈ N |x < i}). Recall that Proposition 1 claims the
unique bargaining outcome of the world λ to be a generalized ﬁxed point x∗ of the function
g.
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Proposition 7 The characteristic function of the world λ can be written as
ξ(x) =
g(x)− xµ(N \ {x})
x(1− x)
in the interior of X. The generalized ﬁxed point x∗ of the function g is the generalized zero
of the function ξ.
Proof. We compute:
u′t(x± 0)
ut(x)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−1/(1− x + t) if t < x
∓1 if t = x
1/(1− t + x) if x < t.
Notice that for a ﬁxed x ∈ IntX the functions u′t(x ± 0)/ut(x) are non–decreasing in t.
Therefore for each x ∈ IntX we have
ϕ−(x) = −
1
1− x
, ϕ+(x) =
1
x
,
ξ(x) = −
µ({i ∈ N |i < x})
1− x
+
µ({i ∈ N |x < i})
x
=
=
µ({i ∈ N |x < i})− xµ(N \ {x})
x(1− x)
=
=
g(x)− xµ(N \ {x})
x(1− x)
.
We argue that g(x′) ≤ x∗ ≤ g(x
′′) whenever x′ and x′′ are points of X such that
x′′ < x∗ < x
′. To see this, let the sequences xn− and x
n
+ be as in Deﬁnition 4. Then x
′′ < xn+
and xn− < x
′ for n large. Since g is a non–increasing function, we have g(x′) ≤ g(xn−) and
g(xn+) ≤ g(x
′′). Therefore, we also have g(x′) ≤ lim g(xn−) ≤ x∗ ≤ lim g(x
n
+) ≤ g(x
′′).
First we consider the case where x∗ lies on the boundary of X. Suppose x∗ = 0. It
follows from the previous paragraph that g(x) ≤ 0 whenever 0 < x ≤ 1. Therefore ξ(x) ≤ 0
for all x ∈ IntX. Since ξ(0) = +∞, it follows that 0 is a generalized ﬁxed point of the
function ξ, as desired.
If x∗ = 1, then 1 ≤ g(x) whenever 0 ≤ x < 1. As xµ(N \ {x}) ≤ 1 it follows that
0 ≤ ξ(x) for all 0 ≤ x < 1. Since ξ(1) = −∞, the point 1 is a generalized ﬁxed point of ξ.
Finally, consider the case where x∗ is in the interior of X. Let z
n
+ = x − 1/n and
zn− = x + 1/n. Notice that g(z
n
−) ≤ x∗ ≤ g(z
n
+) for all n because z
n
+ < x∗ < z
n
−. Therefore,
lim g(zn−) ≤ x∗ ≤ lim g(z
n
+)
We argue that limµ({zn−}) = 0 and limµ({z
n
+}) = 0. Suppose the ﬁrst equation is false.
Replacing, if necessary, the sequence {zn−} by a subsequence we have µ({z
n
−}) > . However,
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since no two points in the sequence {zn−} are the same, µ(∪{z
n
−}) =
∑
µ({zn−}) ≥ +∞, a
contradiction. It follows that limµ(N \ {zn−}) = 1 and limµ(N \ {z
n
+}) = 1.
Now, we compute
lim ξ(zn−) =
lim g(zn−)− x∗
x∗(1− x∗)
≤ 0,
lim ξ(zn+) =
lim g(zn+)− x∗
x∗(1− x∗)
≥ 0,
establishing that x∗ is a generalized zero of ξ.
7 A proof of the main result
Proposition 8 Let f : X → R be a non–negative concave function. Suppose that f is
positive on the interior of X.
(a) For each x ∈ IntX the following inequalities hold:
−
1
1− x
≤
f ′(x + 0)
f(x)
≤
f ′(x− 0)
f(x)
≤
1
x
.
(b) Given an x ∈ X and a number 0 < κ < 1 deﬁne the sets I(x, κ) and B(x, κ) by the
following equations:
I(x, κ) =
[
x
1− lnκ
,
x− lnκ
1− lnκ
]
,
B(x, κ) = {x˙ ∈ X|f(x˙) ≥ κf(x)}.
Then I(x, κ) ⊂ B(x, κ).
Proof. Consider a chain of inequalities
−
f(x)
1− x
≤
f(1)− f(x)
1− x
≤ f ′(x + 0) ≤ f ′(x− 0) ≤
f(x)− f(0)
x
≤
f(x)
x
.
Dividing by f(x) yields the inequalities of claim (a). Consider a concave function 
 = ln f :
IntX → R. We have

′(x + 0) =
f ′(x + 0)
f(x)
and 
′(x− 0) =
f ′(x− 0)
f(x)
.
Given a point x¯ ∈ X, deﬁne a function h : IntX → R by the equation
h(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x− x¯
x
if x ≤ x¯
x¯− x
1− x
if x¯ ≤ x.
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The function h is non–positive and concave and it attains the value of zero at point x¯.
Then for each x ∈ IntX we have the inequalities h(x) ≤ 
′(x + 0)(x − x¯) ≤ 
(x) − 
(x¯),
where the ﬁrst inequality can be established using claim (a).
Both intervals I(x¯, κ) and B(x¯, κ) contain the point x¯, and the interval I(x¯, κ) is non–
degenerate. To prove the inclusion I(x¯, κ) ⊂ B(x¯, κ), it is suﬃcient to prove that either
endpoint of I(x¯, κ) is contained in B(x¯, κ). Thus let x˙ be an endpoint of I(x¯, κ). If x˙ = 0,
then x¯ = 0, and if x˙ = 1, then x¯ = 1. In either case the point x˙ = x¯ is an element
of B(x¯, κ). If x˙ is in the interior of X, it is straightforward to verify that h(x˙) = lnκ.
Therefore lnκ ≤ 
(x˙)− 
(x¯), implying that κf(x¯) ≤ f(x˙), as desired.
Proposition 9
(a) For each x ∈ IntX the inequalities −1/(1− x) ≤ ϕ−(x) ≤ ϕ+(x) ≤ 1/x hold.
(b) Suppose δ ∈ (0, 1) and let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a δ–equilibrium. Then I(E(x•), δ) ⊂ A.
Consequently, A is a non–degenerate interval.
Proof. Claim (a) of Proposition 9 follows immediately from claim (a) of Proposition 8.
Consider the sets
Bt = {x ∈ X|ut(x) ≥ δut(E(x•))}.
By claim (b) of Proposition 8, I(E(x•), δ) ⊂ Bt for each t. One the other hand Bt ⊂ At,
because by Jensen inequality ut(E(x•)) ≥ E(ut(x•)) = yt. The result follows.
Proposition 10 Suppose δ ∈ (0, 1) and let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a δ–equilibrium. Let At =
[x−t , x
+
t ] and A = [x
−, x+]. If x− ∈ IntX, then
sup
x−<x¯t
{δyt/ut(x
−)} = 1,
where the supremum is taken over all players t ∈ N with x− < x¯t. If x
+ ∈ IntX, then
sup
x¯t<x+
{δyt/ut(x
+)} = 1,
where the supremum is taken over all players t ∈ N with x¯t < x
+.
Proof. We only prove the ﬁrst claim, the proof of the second claim being similar.
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Let r−t = δyt/ut(x
−). We know that r−t ≤ 1 for all t. Take a player t such that x
−
t is in
the interior of X. Then ut(x
−
t ) = δyt and we have the following chain of inequalities:
0 ≤ 1− r−t = 1−
ut(x
−
t )
ut(x−)
=
=
ut(x
−)− ut(x
−
t )
ut(x−)
≤
≤
ut(x
−)− ut(x
−
t )
ut(x
−
t )
≤
≤
u′t(x
−
t + 0)
ut(x
−
t )
(x− − x−t ) ≤
≤
x− − x−t
x−t
,
where the last inequality follows from claim (a) of Proposition 8.
First we show that sup{r−t } = 1, where the supremum is taken over all players is N .
Since x− = sup{x−t } there is an increasing sequence x
−
tn converging to x
−. Of course, x−tn is
in the interior of X for n large enough, so the inequalities of the previous paragraph apply.
In particular,
0 ≤ 1− r−tn ≤
x− − x−tn
x−tn
.
Since the sequence on the right side converges to zero, the sequence r−tn converges to one.
This proves that sup{r−t } = 1.
Now, for any player t with x¯t ≤ x
− the function ut is non–increasing on the interval
A = [x−, x+]. In particular, ut(x) ≤ ut(x
−) for any x ∈ A. It follows that yt ≤ ut(x
−),
since yt is an integral of ut(xi) where each xi is a point of A. Thus r
−
t ≤ δ for any t with
x¯t ≤ x
−. This proves that supx−<x¯t{r
−
t } = 1.
Proposition 11 Suppose δ ∈ (0, 1). Let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a δ–equilibrium, where A =
[x−, x+]. If x+ ∈ IntX, then the following inequalities hold:
δµ(x+ < x¯i)ϕ
+(x+) ≤
1− δ
x+ − x−
δµ(x¯i < x
+)ϕ−(x+) ≤ −
1− δ
x+ − x−
.
If x− ∈ IntX, then, the following inequalities hold:
−
1− δ
x+ − x−
≤ δµ(x¯i < x
−)ϕ−(x−)
1− δ
x+ − x−
≤ δµ(x− < x¯i)ϕ
+(x−)
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Proof. Suppose that x+ ∈ IntX. We prove the ﬁrst inequality of Proposition 11. Let
x+ ≤ x¯t. First we snow that
µ(x+ < x¯i)[ut(x
+)− ut(x
−)] ≤ yt − ut(x
−).
Too see this, for i ∈ N deﬁne xˆi to be x
− if x¯i ≤ x
+ and x+ otherwise. Clearly, xˆi is a
measurable function of i. Furthermore, xˆi ≤ xi for all i ∈ N . As the function ut is non–
decreasing on the interval [x−, x+], we have the inequality ut(xˆi) ≤ ut(xi) for all i ∈ N .
The integration gives µ(x¯i ≤ x
+)ut(x
−)+µ(x+ < x¯i)ut(x
+) ≤ yt. Subtracting ut(x
−) from
both sides yields the desired inequality.
As before, let x+ ≤ x¯t. From the fact that δyt ≤ ut(x
−) ≤ ut(x
+) it follows that
δ[yt − ut(x
−)] ≤ (1− δ)ut(x
+).
Finally, we use the inequality
u′t(x
+ + 0) ≤
ut(x
+)− ut(x
−)
x+ − x−
.
Combining them all, we conclude that that for any player t with x+ ≤ x¯t
δµ(x+ < x¯i)
u′t(x
+ + 0)
ut(x+)
≤ δµ(x+ < x¯i)
[ut(x
+)− ut(x
−)]
ut(x+)[x+ − x−]
≤
≤ δ
yt − ut(x
−)
ut(x+)[x+ − x−]
≤
≤
1− δ
x+ − x−
.
For a player t with x¯t ≤ x
+ the expression on the extreme left–hand side of the last
inequality is non–positive, because u′t(x
+ + 0) ≤ 0. This proves the ﬁrst inequality of
Proposition 11.
We now prove the second inequality of Proposition 11. Let x¯t < x
+. First we show
that
µ(x¯i < x
+)[ut(x
+)− ut(xt)] ≤ ut(x
+)− yt.
To see this, for i ∈ N deﬁne xˆi to be xt if x¯i < x
+ and x+ otherwise. Since xt is the
maximum of ut on [0, 1], ut(xi) ≤ ut(xˆi) for all i ∈ N . The integration yields yt ≤ µ(x¯i <
x+)ut(xt) + µ(x
+ ≤ x¯i)ut(x
+). Subtracting ut(x
+) from both sides and multiplying by
minus one give the desired inequality.
Now since x− ≤ xt < x
+, we have
u′t(x
+ − 0) ≤
ut(x
+)− ut(xt)
x+ − xt
≤
ut(x
+)− ut(xt)
x+ − x−
≤ 0.
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Thus for each t with x¯t < x
+ we have the inequalities
δµ(x¯i < x
+)
u′t(x
+ − 0)
ut(x+)
≤ δµ(x¯i < x
+)
[ut(x
+)− ut(xt)]
ut(x+)[x+ − x−]
≤
≤ δ
ut(x
+)− yt
ut(x+)[x+ − x−]
=
= −
r+t − δ
x+ − x−
,
where r+t = δyt/ut(x
+). Using Proposition 10, we obtain
δµ(x¯i < x
+)ϕ−(x+) ≤ δµ(x¯i < x
+) inf
x¯t<x+
{
u′t(x
+ − 0)
ut(x+)
}
≤
≤ inf
x¯t<x+
{
−
r+t − δ
x+ − x−
}
=
= −
1− δ
x+ − x−
.
Suppose that x− ∈ IntX. We now prove the third inequality of Proposition 11. This
proof is similar to the proof of the ﬁrst inequality. Let x¯t ≤ x
−. First we show that
ut(x
+)− yt ≤ µ(x¯i < x
−)[ut(x
+)− ut(x
−)].
To prove this, notice that the function ut is non–increasing on the interval [x
−, x+]. The
expected utility of player t can therefore be estimated from below as µ(x¯i < x
−)ut(x
−) +
µ(x− ≤ x¯i)ut(x
+) ≤ yt. Subtracting ut(x
+) from both sides and multiplying by minus one
yields the desired inequality. Secondly, the fact that δyt ≤ ut(x
+) ≤ ut(x
−) implies the
inequality
−(1− δ)ut(x
−) ≤ δ[ut(x
+)− yt].
Thirdly, we have
ut(x
+)− ut(x
−)
x+ − x−
≤ u′t(x
− − 0).
Combining these three inequalities, we conclude that for each player t with x¯t ≤ x
−
−
1− δ
x+ − x−
≤ δµ(x¯i < x
−)
u′t(x
− − 0)
ut(x−)
.
This inequality also holds if x− < x¯t since in this case 0 ≤ u
′
t(x
− − 0). This proves the
third inequality of Proposition 11.
The proof of the fourth inequality is similar to the proof of the second one. Let x− < x¯t.
First, we establish
yt − ut(x
−) ≤ µ(x− < x¯i)[ut(xt)− ut(x
−)].
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This is done by estimating thew expected utility of player t from above, as follows: yt ≤
µ(x¯i ≤ x
−)ut(x
−) + µ(x− < x¯i)ut(xt), and then subtracting ut(x
−) from both sides. Since
x− < xt ≤ x
+, we have
0 ≤
ut(xt)− ut(x
−)
x+ − x−
≤
ut(xt)− ut(x
−)
xt − x−
≤ u′t(x
− + 0).
Thus for each player t with x− < x¯t we have the inequalities
r−t − δ
x+ − x−
= δ
yt − ut(x
−)
ut(x−)[x+ − x−]
≤
≤ δµ(x− < x¯i)
[ut(xt)− ut(x
−)]
ut(x−)[x+ − x−]
≤
≤ δµ(x− < x¯i)
u′t(x
− + 0)
ut(x−)
.
Finally, using Proposition 10, we obtain
1− δ
x+ − x−
= sup
x−<x¯t
{
r−t − δ
x+ − x−
}
≤
≤ δµ(x− < x¯i) sup
x−<x¯t
{
u′t(x
− + 0)
ut(x−)
}
≤ δµ(x− < x¯i)ϕ
+(x−).
This completes the proof of Proposition 11.
Proposition 12 Each bargaining outcome of the world ω is a generalized zero point of the
characteristic function ξ.
Proof. Let x be a bargaining outcome of ω. By Deﬁnition 3, there exist sequences An,
δn, and xn such that An is a social acceptance set in a δn–equilibrium of ω, xn is a point in
An, the sequence δn converges to 1 and xn converges to x. Let An = [xn−, x
n
+]. Replacing,
if necessary, sequences by subsequences, assume that both xn− and x
n
+ converge. Then
Theorem 3 implies that both sequences converge to x.
First suppose that x ∈ IntX. Then xn− and x
n
+ both lie in IntX for n large enough.
The ﬁrst two inequalities in Proposition 11 then imply that ξ(xn+) ≤ 0 while the last two
imply 0 ≤ ξ(xn−). It follows that x is generalized ﬁxed point of the function ξ.
Now suppose x = 0. Then xn+ < 1 for n large enough. Since A
n is a non–degenerate
interval by Proposition 9, we have 0 < xn+. Then again the ﬁrst two inequalities in Propo-
sition 11 imply that ξ(xn+) ≤ 0. Since ξ(0) = +∞, it follows that x is a generalized ﬁxed
point of ξ. The argument in the case x = 1 is similar.
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8 The analysis of the game
We start our analysis by computing the payoﬀs induced by a joint stationary strategy
σ = (x•, A•). Let yt denote the expected payoﬀ to player t at the beginning of the game,
let A = ∩At be a social acceptance set and Na be the set of players whose proposal is
accepted under σ i.e. Na = {t ∈ N |xt ∈ A}. Let Nr denote the set of players whose
proposal is rejected, i.e. the complement of Na. Notice that A is measurable set as it is an
intersection of measurable sets, and the set Na is A –measurable as it is a preimage of an
A –measurable set under an A –measurable map. If nature chooses a proposer i from Na,
player t receives a payoﬀ of ut(xi), while if nature chooses a proposer from Nr, then player
t’s payoﬀ is δyt. Thus yt satisﬁes the following relation:
yt =
∫
Na
ut(xi)dµ(i) + δµ(Nr)yt.
Solving the equation, we obtain the following expression for yt:
yt =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
1− δµ(Nr)
∫
Na
ut(xi)dµ(i) if µ(Na) > 0,
0 otherwise.
Of course, we are only interested in admissible, that is joint strategies that result in
a well–deﬁned payoﬀ to each player at any node of the game. While any joint stationary
strategy induces a well–deﬁned payoﬀ at each node of the game, ﬁnding suﬃcient conditions
for a general joint strategy to be admissible is a diﬃcult problem on its own and it is
certainly beyond the scope of this paper. In what follows, we simply assume that all joint
strategies involved are admissible.
Theorem 5 Let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a δ–equilibrium. Then a joint stationary strategy σ =
(x•, A•) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ(δ).
The proof of Theorem 5 consists of two steps. The ﬁrst step is to show that strategy
σ is robust to all one–shot deviations. Recall that a strategy σ¯t for player t is said to be a
one–shot deviation from σ at node h if it coincides with the strategy σt on all nodes but
h. The second step establishes the one–shot deviation property for the game Γ(δ). The
property states that if there is a proﬁtable deviation from a joint strategy σ, then there is
a proﬁtable one–shot deviation. The one–shot deviation property is well–known for ﬁnite
games, i.e. for games with a ﬁnite game tree and ﬁnitely many players and less so for
inﬁnite games such as Γ(δ).
Proposition 13 Let (x•, y•, A•, A) be a δ–equilibrium. Let σ denote a joint stationary
strategy (x•, A•). Then no player has a one–shot proﬁtable deviation from σt in any sub-
game of Γ = Γ(δ).
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Proof. Let σ¯t be a one–shot deviation from σt in a subgame Γ(h) of Γ starting at node h.
Suppose player t has to make a proposal at node h. Under strategy σt player t proposes
alternative xt, which is accepted, leading to a payoﬀ of ut(xt) for player t. Suppose under
strategy σ¯t player t makes a proposal x. If x is not an element of the social acceptance set
A = ∩Ai, the proposal x will be rejected. As σ¯t coincides with σt on all nodes following h,
player t will receive a payoﬀ of δyt. By the deﬁnition of δ–equilibrium, δyt ≤ ut(xt). If x
is an element of A, then x it is accepted and player t receives a payoﬀ of ut(x). However,
ut(x) ≤ ut(xt), because by the deﬁnition of δ–equilibrium, xt maximizes the function ut on
the set A.
Suppose player t has to react to a proposal x at node h. Suppose x is accepted by player
t under strategy σt but rejected under strategy σ¯t. Then strategy σt leads to a payoﬀ of
either ut(x) or δyt, depending on whether other players accept or reject x, while strategy
σ¯t leads to payoﬀ of δyt. Then σ¯t is not a proﬁtable deviation, because δyt ≤ ut(x), since
x ∈ At. Conversely, suppose x is rejected by player t under strategy σt but is accepted
under strategy σ¯t. Then strategy σt leads to a payoﬀ of δyt, while strategy σ¯t leads to pay-
oﬀ of either ut(x) or δyt, depending on whether x is accepted or rejected by other players.
Again, σ¯t cannot be a proﬁtable deviation, since ut(x) ≤ δyt, as x is not an element of At.
Proposition 14 Let σ be a proﬁle of strategies. If player t has a proﬁtable deviation from
σ, then player t has a proﬁtable one–shot deviation from σ.
Proof. Given a node h we let τ(h) denote the period node h belongs to. Suppose player
t has a proﬁtable deviation σ¯t from σ in the subgame Γ(h¯) of the game Γ which increases
the subgame payoﬀ by ε > 0. First we show that player t has a proﬁtable deviation in the
subgame Γ(h¯) that coincides with σt on all nodes corresponding to the ﬁrst r periods of
the subgame Γ(h¯).
Since the payoﬀ player t can get in period τ is bounded by δτ , the subgame payoﬀ for
any strategy that agrees with σ¯t on all nodes corresponding to the ﬁrst τ periods of the
subgame diﬀers from the payoﬀ on σ¯t by at most δ
τ . Set r = ln(ε)/ ln(δ) and deﬁne the
strategy σrt as follows:
σrt (h) =
{
σ¯t(h) if τ(h) ≤ r + τ(h¯)
σt(h) otherwise.
By deﬁnition, σrt coincides with σ¯t on all nodes corresponding to the ﬁrst r periods of the
subgame Γ(h¯). Therefore, the subgame payoﬀ on σrt diﬀers from the payoﬀ on σ¯t by δ
r = ε
at the most. It follows that σrt is a proﬁtable deviation from σt in the subgame Γ(h¯).
Suppose there is a node h in the subgame Γ(h¯) with τ(h) = r + τ(h¯) such that player
t has to act at h and strategy σrt is a proﬁtable deviation from σ in the subsubgame Γ(h).
Then σrt is a proﬁtable one–shot deviation in the subsubgame Γ(h). This follows from the
fact that each player acts at most once every period. Thus if node h′ follows node h and
player t has to act at h′, then τ(h′) > r + τ(h¯), implying that σrt (h
′) = σt(h
′). In this case
the argument is complete.
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Suppose there is no node h in the subgame Γ(h¯) with τ(h) = r + τ(h¯) such that player
t has to act at h and strategy σrt is a proﬁtable deviation in the subsubgame Γ(h). In this
case we deﬁne a new strategy for t as follows:
σr−1t (h) =
{
σrt (h) if τ(h) ≤ r + τ(h¯)− 1
σt(h) otherwise.
Then the payoﬀ on σr−1t at any node of the subgame Γ(h¯) is at least as high as the payoﬀ
on σrt . In particular, σ
r−1
t is a proﬁtable deviation from σ in the subgame Γ(h¯). Iterating
this argument, we shall be able to ﬁnd a one–shot proﬁtable deviation for player t.
We now turn to the converse of Theorem 5. Before we state the result a few remarks
are in order concerning players’ equilibrium behavior in the response stage of the game.
It is clear that individual acceptance sets are not uniquely determined. Take a subgame
perfect equilibrium σ = (x•, A•). If alternative x is not accepted by player t (x /∈ At),
each player i preceding player t in the response stage is indiﬀerent between accepting and
rejecting x, since by the stationarity of σ the continuation payoﬀ is the same whether x is
rejected by player i or player by t. Starting from σ, one can obtain a new subgame perfect
equilibrium by adding x to or subtracting x from the individual acceptance set Ai of player
i < t. The proﬁle of strategies thus obtained is a subgame perfect equilibrium and it is
equivalent to σ in the sense that the proposals, the social acceptance set and equilibrium
payoﬀs are the same.
On top of the indeterminateness of the individual acceptance sets, when there are
inﬁnitely many players, coordination failure might occur in the response stage. The coor-
dination failure may be present in equilibrium despite the fact that the players react to a
proposal sequentially.
As an example, consider a world with a set of players N = [0, 1]. Suppose that the
order in which the players react during the response stage is the natural order on N , i.e.
player 0 reacts ﬁrst, player 1 reacts last. Let ι be a sequence in N converging to 1. Let
C be a subset of players ∪ιn. Then any joint strategy σ = (x•, A•) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium, provided only that the sets At are empty for each t ∈ C and A1 = X. The
condition that At is empty means that player t rejects all proposals, while A1 = X means
that player 1 accepts all proposals. Of course, σ induces perpetual disagreement. Each
player t < 1 in the response stage is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting a proposal,
as player t knows that even if he will accept, a proposal will be later rejected by one of the
players in C.
It is clear that the situation described above is peculiar to the case where there are
inﬁnitely many players. If there were ﬁnitely many players, since the last player accepts
all proposals, the player who is second–last to respond should accept all proposals with a
positive payoﬀ. In the above example there is no second–last player in the sense that each
player t < 1 is succeeded by a member of C.
To rule out coordination problems as described above we shall require that if alternative
x is rejected, then for at least one player t rejection must be a best response not only to
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the current strategy of his opponents, but also to a modiﬁed proﬁle of strategies where all
players following t accept a proposal in question, but continue playing according to the
original proﬁle later on. The deﬁnition is as follows.
Deﬁnition 7 Let σ be a joint strategy and let h be a history of player ending with player
k proposing alternative x. Let ht denote the history following h after which player t has
to react to the proposal. Let σat denote a strategy for player t that coincides with σt on all
histories other than ht and σ
a
t (ht) = a.
A joint strategy σ is said to be free of coordination failures in the response stage if
either x is accepted under σ or there is a player t with σt(ht) = r such that the strategy σt
is a best response against a proﬁle of strategies σa−t of player t’s opponents in the subgame
Γ(δ)(ht).
A subgame perfect equilibrium σ is free of coordination failures in the response stage
provided that any rejected alternative is rejected by at most ﬁnitely many players. In this
case player t who is the last player in the order < to reject x satisﬁes the requirement of
the above deﬁnition. In particular, if the player set N is ﬁnite, then any subgame perfect
equilibrium is free of coordination failures. On the other hand, a joint strategy considered
above violates the condition in Deﬁnition 7, as each player t should accept any alternative
x having positive utility, provided that the following players following t accept.
Theorem 6 Suppose 0 ≤ δ < 1. Consider a joint strategy σ = (x•, A•) with the expected
payoﬀ map y• and the social acceptance set A = ∩At. Suppose σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium and that it is free of coordination failures in the response stage. Then there
exists a δ–equilibrium (x•, y•, B•, B) such that IntB ⊂ A ⊂ B.
Proof. The proof uses Proposition 8 of Section 7.
Deﬁne the collections of sets B•, C•, and the sets B and C as follows:
Bt = {x ∈ X|ut(x) ≥ δyt} and B = ∩Bt,
Ct = {x ∈ X|ut(x) > δyt} and C = ∩Ct.
All sets are convex, the set B is closed and IntB ⊂ C.
First we prove the inclusions C ⊂ A ⊂ B. To prove the ﬁrst inclusion, suppose x is not
an element of A. Let the strategies σa• be as in Deﬁnition 7 above. There exists a player t
with σt(ht) = r such that the strategy σt is a best response against a joint strategy σ
a
−t of
player t’s opponents at node ht. Playing σt when other players use σ
a
−t results leads to a
payoﬀ of δyt for player t. On the other hand, playing σ
a
t against σ
a
−t leads to an acceptance
of x and a payoﬀ of ut(x). Since the strategy σt should be at least as good as the strategy
σat at node ht, we conclude that ut(x) ≤ δyt. This means that x /∈ Ct and therefore x is
not an element of C.
To prove the second inclusion, let x ∈ A. Let σrt denote a strategy for player t that
coincides with σt on all histories other than ht and σ
r
t (ht) = r. When other players use
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strategies σ−t, the payoﬀ on strategy σ
r
t at node ht is δyt, while the payoﬀ on σt is ut(x).
Since σt is at least as good as σ
r
t when other players use σ−t, we conclude that ut(x) ≥ δyt.
Thus x ∈ Bt. Since t is arbitrary, x ∈ B.
We prove that the set A is non–empty. As before, let Na = {t ∈ N |xt ∈ A} and let Nr
be a complement of Na. We show that µ(Na) > 0. If µ(Na) = 0, then y• is identically zero.
In this case IntX ⊂ C ⊂ A. Thus each alternative in the interior of X is unanimously
accepted. Take t ∈ Nr and x ∈ IntX. Then the strategy σ
′
t = (x,At) improves the payoﬀ
of player t at each node where t has to make a proposal, contradicting the assumption that
σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We prove that the set B is not a singleton. Suppose B is a singleton consisting of
point x¯ alone. Then A consists of x¯ alone as well and xt = x¯ for all t ∈ Na. Then and
yt = λut(x¯), where λ = µ(Na)/[1− δµ(Nr)]. Let κ = δλ. Notice that 0 ≤ κ < 1. The set
B can now be written as
B = ∩{x ∈ X|ut(x) ≥ κut(x¯)}.
If κ = 0, then B = X, and if 0 < κ < 1, then Proposition 8 applies to show that B contains
a non–degenerate interval I(x¯, κ). In either case, B is a non–singleton, a contradiction.
Since B is a non–empty convex subset of X and it is not a singleton, it has a non–empty
interior. Therefore, the set C is non–empty.
We now show that Na = N . Suppose not. Take t ∈ Nr and x ∈ C. Then strategy
σ′t = (x,At) improves the payoﬀ to player t at each node where t has to make a proposal,
contradicting the subgame perfection hypothesis. Since Na = N , the expected utility of
player t can be written as
yt =
∫
ut(xi)dµ(i).
Finally, we have to show that the proposal xt of player t maximizes the function ut on
B. Suppose not. Then there is an x ∈ IntB such that ut(x) > ut(xt). As IntB ⊂ C ⊂ A,
the point x is unanimously accepted. The strategy σ′t = (x,At) is then a proﬁtable devia-
tion from σt by player t at any node where t has to make a proposal, a contradiction.
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